It by no means follows that no transformational description of case agreement is possible in Greek. It is in fact possible to give a formalization of principle 1 [my description of the agreement rule] in transformational terms. This formalization consists of two transformational rules: first, a rule that gives nouns and their modifying participles or adjectives an index which marks them as having been in the same simple S at the end of the relevant cycle; second, a post-cyclic rule which assigns case to an adjective or participle on the basis of the case given to its co-indexed NP ... We conclude that it is possible to give a general formulation of principle 1 in the Aspects theory.
Thus B&B claim that both rules are transformations. But the first rule they propose is in fact not a transformation: a rule that 'gives nouns and their modi-fying participles or adjectives an index' is an insertion rule. Transformational rules that insert things would have to insert either (1) a copy of some constituent already in the tree, or (2) a constant, i.e. some single, specific, fixed grammatical element. One might think that the rule proposed by B&B is an instance of (2), but it is not. The reason is that their 'index' is not a single, specific, fixed grammatical element, with the SAME element being added to each NP-adjective/ participle pair. Moreover, the rule must be capable of checking that no given element is ever inserted twice in the same tree; otherwise, the post-cyclic agreement rule would give the wrong results. Since there is no upper bound on the number of NP-adjective/participle pairs in a natural language, their rule would have to be capable of inserting an INFINITE NUMBER OF DIFFERENT GRAMMATICAL ELEMENTS, and moreover it must be able to keep track of which ones have been previously inserted. Now transformational rules cannot do this sort of thing. They can only insert specific, fixed elements listed in the rule, with each such element to be inserted in a specific class of environments. What B&B have proposed is not a transformational rule at all, but an elaborate global coding mechanism. The purpose of this coding mechanism is simply to keep track of where certain elements which enter into an agreement rule were at an earlier stage of the derivation. The B&B proposal is not within transformational grammar proper. Since it involves an extension of the sort discussed above, it might most appropriately be called 'extended transformational grammar', which is of course a very different animal.
Global coding mechanisms are, interestingly enough, not new in the history of linguistics in the past decade. For example, Harman 1963 proposed that one could extend phrase-structure grammar by the addition of a global coding mechanism and thus avoid the need for transformations. Harman's proposal involved, in essence, adding markers to non-terminal symbols, forming complex symbols, and letting phrase-structure rules be sensitive to such markers. Chomsky (1966:42) , in rejecting extended phrase-structure grammars, commented as follows: 'The rules are designed so that indices can be carried along in the course of a derivation. The indices can be used, in effect, to code many "global operations" on strings (e.g. certain grammatical transformations) and to code context restrictions of various sorts. ' The interest in the parallel between the Harman and B&B proposals goes beyond the fact that both use global coding mechanisms. In both cases, one must consider the naturalness of the linguistic units used in the coding operation. It is generally conceded that the units used in phonological description should have an independent natural basis in phonetics. Phonological rules are taken as using phonetic features, which are given independent of those phonological rules. The same considerations of naturalness obtain in syntax. The theory of generative semantics claims that the linguistic elements used in grammar have an independent natural basis in the human conceptual system. Rational thought requires a distinction between things named and what is said about those things. In other words, an elementary proposition is taken as consisting of one or more arguments and a single atomic predicate that says sGmething about those arguments. Natural logic characterizes natural classes of atomic predicates in terms of their logical properties, as given in truth conditions. Generative semantics takes grammar as being based on the independently given natural logical categories such as predicate and argument, and on natural logical classes of atomic predicates, given by independently needed truth conditions. In generative semantics, possible grammars are limited by the requirement that the non-phonological elements used have a natural semantic basis, independent of the rules of the grammar of any particular natural language.
Most of the arguing about generative semantics in recent years may be viewed as centering on the issue of whether the categories of the human conceptual system can or should provide the independent natural basis for syntax (the generative semantics proposal) or whether there must be some other independent natural basis for the choice of elements used in rules of grammar.2 But there is no question that any explanatorily adequate account of universal grammar must provide such an externally motivated (and therefore independent) class of elements to be used in the statement of rules of grammar. Any arbitrary choice of elements is a movement away from naturalness and a movement away from an explanatory basis for syntactic theory.
It is illuminating to look at Harman's coding proposal from this point of view. For each sentence type he proposed to account for, he needed a separate gram- The only function of this device is to code the fact that certain phonological rules are sensitive to the occurrence of certain syntactic rules at some distant earlier point in the derivation. Again a new grammatical element (the 'special symbol') appears. The implicit claim is made that this new element characterizes a real category distinction. Again, the stock of grammatical categories is increased by an arbitrary category, and the naturalness of the description is correspondingly decreased.
B&B also consider seriously, as an alternate solution, a proposal made by Bresnan (MS) . Recall that the phenomenon in question involves the distinction between sentences like these:
(1) Irv is there and John is too. Assuming this, she then proposes to account for the ungrammaticality of 2 by using a constraint to the effect that the structural indices of movement and deletion rules cannot pick out a word-internal constituent. With this principle, and the claim that the procliticization rule yielding structures like 5 applies as the last rule in the syntactic cycle, Bresnan can account for the ungrammaticality of 2 without appealing to a global rule. Assuming that 2 is derived via a deletion rule from the structure underlying (6) Irv is there and John is there too, procliticization yielding 'sthere would apply on a cycle before the application of the rule deleting the second there in sentence 1. By the time that the deletion rule becomes applicable, there has been made part of the phonological word 'sthere, and deletion cannot take place, since the constituent to be deleted is wordinternal.
There is, however, a fundamental difficulty with Bresnan's analysis. The orthographic tradition which prefers the segmentation in 4 to that in 5 is based on a deep fact about English morphophonemics. The fact is that 's assimilates in voicing to the PRECEDING, not the following, segment. The assimilation rule is the same rule that applies to suffixal /S/ in the possessive and plural, where it clearly applies to a suffix rather than to a prefix on the following word. It is natural for such assimilations to apply word-internally; it would be completely unnatural for them to apply across word boundaries (in fact, across major constituent boundaries), but not word-internally. Under Bresnan's analysis, the assimilation of /S/ would have to apply word-internally in the case of possessives and plurals, but tion for contraction, it follows that in positions where stress reduction is blocked, contraction cannot take place. In the following examples, the word in small capitals cannot undergo stress reduction when followed by a parenthetical expression, as in the (b) According to the traditional treatment, both assimilation rules are word-internal, and depend on which word the /S/ is attached to-to the left as in 7, or to the right as in 8. According to Bresnan's treatment, the /S/ resulting from tense contraction always goes to the right. But in the case of 7, the rule that assimilates /S/ to the voicing of the following segment word-internally does not apply, while the rule assimilating the /S/ to the voicing of the previous segment does apply across word and major constituent boundaries. This is a situation which is, as far as I know, unprecedented in phonology. In general, when two assimilation rules are both applicable, one word-internally and the other across word boundaries, the word-internal rule takes precedence. Since Bresnan's treatment violates this general principle of universal phonology, it must be rejected. Anyone who wants to maintain Bresnan's analysis must show that the choice of word-external assimilation over word-internal assimilation follows from general phonological principles (which are determined by a study of the world's languages). In the absence of such a demonstration, one must conclude that, as is so often the case, there is a real basis for the traditional orthography. What [Chomsky] proposes is that when some island-forming node had a constituent moved out of it, a special symbol should be associated with the node in question, this symbol indicating that a violation has occurred. If this node is later deleted, as by Sluicing in the sentences under discussion, then the special symbol marking the violation is erased along with the node in question, and the resulting elliptical sentence is thereby predicted to be well-formed (61).
Here another new grammatical element is introduced, this time its function being to mark ungrammatical sentences by appearing in surface structure in violation of an output condition saying that no such element can appear in surface structure. It is important to note that this new grammatical element must be 'invisible' with respect to deletion under identity, since when Sluicing applies, the deleted portion of the tree will contain this element, while the deleting portion will not. Invisibility with respect to identity conditions must also be a property of each of the infinite number of new grammatical elements proposed by B&B for handling Greek case. This is an important fact about these proposed new elements, since identity conditions provide a test for the existence of proposed grammatical elements that do not appear overtly. Elements introduced purely for the purpose of coding global rules flunk this test, which raises serious doubts as to their existence. Besides suffering from the general inadequacies of coding proposals, Chomsky's claim runs into empirical difficulties as well. These have to do with (1) dialect variations and (2) degree of ill-formedness. Let us call the special symbol proposed by Chomsky '+BAD'. According to Chomsky's proposal, a sentence generated by the grammar with +BAD in its surface structure is ungrammatical. But this does not account for the facts. Take sentences like these: (9) John and someone were dancing, but I don't know who. (10) John didn't lift a finger to help, but Bill did. Though I, like B&B, find both 9 and 10 fully grammatical, many speakers of English find them somewhat ungrammatical, but not nearly as bad as their counterparts without deletion. In such dialects, Chomsky's proposal does not account for the facts. If we attempt to modify Chomsky's proposal to account for them, it turns out that we have to say something like this:
(11) If +BAD was ever present in a derivation and subsequently deleted, then the sentence is partly ungrammatical. But 11 is a global rule, requiring information about the derivation as a whole. Thus, one would need a global rule to make Chomsky's proposal work for dialects with reduced rather than full grammaticality.
Of course, neither Chomsky's principle nor 11 is fully general. B&B propose that such principles apply in the case of all deletions of negative polarity elements, as in 10, and in all deletions of any sort universally. But not even all negative polarity items work that way: (12) *John won't arrive until tomorrow, but Bill will. B&B base many of their claims, especially in discussing arguments 2, 5, 6, and 7, on the assumption that the grammatical framework in which their counter-' See Borkin et al., MS, for a discussion. Also see Kisseberth, MS b, for a discussion of eliminating rule-ordering in phonology. Extrinsic rule-ordering-that is, the inclusion of ruleordering statements as part of the grammar of a language-has been taken for granted since the beginning of studies in generative grammar. In effect, extrinsic rule-ordering is a blocking device, blocking derivations in which rules apply in other than the permitted order. But it is a peculiar blocking device, since it operates 'blindly'. In phonology, rule-ordering blocks phonological derivations without mentioning any phonological elements. In syntax, rule-ordering blocks derivations without mentioning any grammatical elements. Given that the elements of phonology and syntax form (or should form) natural bases for those areas of study, the use of rule-ordering as a blocking device is completely unnatural. As Kisseberth observes, in the case of phonology one can in most cases accomplish the same blocking in two ways: (1) extrinsic rule-ordering, or (2) letting a phonological rule have a global environment which mentions phonological properties of either underlying phonological or phonetic representations. The latter method accomplishes the blocking on a phonological basis. Thus, any choice of extrinsic rule-ordering over global rules in such cases would be a step in the direction of arbitrariness. proposals are given is 'less powerful' than the global framework, and therefore preferable. As we have seen, that is not the case. If one looks closely at their counter-proposals, one finds that they employ all sorts of grammatical devices not needed in an appropriately constrained theory of global grammar of the sort discussed above. The claim that they are using more restrictive and 'less powerful' descriptive devices turns out to be false. They are using different descriptive devices, and assuming the existence of grammatical elements which are not externally motivated. In some cases, they assume that the devices and elements they use, e.g. extrinsic rule-ordering statements and syntactic features, require no justification, since they were proposed at a historically earlier period and accepted then without question. However, the possibility of eliminating such devices and such elements raises the issue of their justification. The same is true of various other descriptive devices and grammatical elements that B&B assume without question. Let us look at their discussions of arguments 2, 5, 6, and 7, with respect to the types of devices and elements which they require, but which are not required in a theory of global grammar with a semantic basis. (1) letting morphophonemic rules be interspersed among the syntactic rules, and (2) introducing level-constraints which block derivations (recall that their rule 2 is not a transformation) and letting them also be interspersed among the transformations. In both instances, they are widening the cass of possible grammars. In addition, their solution requires extrinsic rule-ordering, which seems not to be needed in global grammars. Second, they do not distinguish between noun phrases like the pictures of Raquel Welch and the lovers of Raquel Welch on the basis of the different semantic relations involved (a distinction which must be specified independently of any particular grammar of English, and is therefore externally motivated); instead they choose a category distinction (suggested by Bresnan), using the category N, which is arbitrary rather than externally motivated. The global solution avoids extrinsic rule-ordering, does without the arbitrary category N, and permits one to limit the class of possible grammars by requiring all morphophonemic rules to apply closer to surface structure than all syntactic rules. The B&B proposal is by no means a 'less powerful' alternative. If anything, it is a less natural alternative. The advantage is a simple one: global rules enable us to eliminate syntactic features-in particular rule-features. Like most syntactic features proposed to date, rule-features were elements with no other purpose than to code global information. Though they could be predicted from the governed rules of the grammar, and though there weren't very many of them (only about 10 or 15 governed rules have been found to date), they were still grammatical elements that appeared in trees. Like most other syntactic features, they had no external motivation, no natural basis outside the grammatical system. Thus, eliminating them has the same advantage as eliminating other syntactic features and arbitrary markers from trees: one gets that much closer to a natural basis for syntax, while the avoidance of elements that are not externally motivated enables one to see more clearly the true nature of syntactic rules, namely that they are global.
The B&B counter-proposal makes heavy use of syntactic features and employs other arbitrary elements such as A. B&B claim that they are staying 'within the Aspects theory'; but again they make an important change (67), accepting Emonds' empty-node proposal. Emonds proposes that certain NP nodes do not dominate anything in deep structure. This is a considerable change in the notion of the phrase-marker, which is at the heart of the Aspects theory. A phrase-marker is, in that theory, a labeled bracketing of a terminal string. Without the terminal elements, there can be no bracketing of them. If one views Emonds' proposal in terms of the Aspects theory, one finds he is proposing something impossible: bracketing of a terminal element without its being there. Emonds is proposing a rather different theory of a phrase-marker-a proposal by no means 'within the Aspects theory'. (c) The Baker-Brame claim that global grammar is necessarily 'more powerful' (that is, characterizes more possible grammars) than transformational grammar is false. The two are incommensurable.
The point to be borne in mind is that grammatical elements, like phonological elements, need external motivation. Generative semantics has claimed that the human conceptual system, as characterized by the study of natural logic, provides such motivation. Transformational grammar, which claims that syntax is independent of meaning, logic, and the human conceptual system in general, has so far made no attempt to provide external motivation for the elements used in syntax. If those who are still trying to make transformational grammar work are to avoid the pitfalls of the Baker-Brame coding proposals, they must seriously address themselves to this issue. They must find external motivation for grammatical elements, so that arbitrary coding proposals can be avoided. The question of whether rules of grammar are global cannot be separated from considerations of naturalness. At present, such considerations favor the theory of global grammar.5
